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the years following a takeover by using unique detailed firm-level data for Sweden for the period 
1993-2002. The paper takes particular account of the potential endogeneity of the acquisition 
decision (for example due to “cherry picking”) by implementing an instrumental variable approach 
and propensity score matching with difference-in-difference estimation technique. Moreover, in line 
with recent literature on firm heterogeneity in international trade, this paper allows for the 
acquisition effect to differ depending on whether the targeted firms were domestic multinational or 
non-multinationals before the foreign takeover. This paper also allows for the acquisition effect to 
differ depending on whether the acquisition is horizontal or vertical. The result shows that foreign 
acquisition has no effects on overall, skilled or less-skilled wage growth neither in targeted Swedish 
MNEs nor in targeted Swedish non-MNEs and neither if the acquisition was motivated by vertical 
or horizontal motives. However, the results indicate that both targeted Swedish MNEs and non-
MNEs have better growth in TFP after vertical foreign acquisition only but no such impact from 
horizontal foreign acquisition.  
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1.  Introduction  
 
In the last two decades, international mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have increased substantially 
worldwide and, as a result, the share of foreign ownership in the total population of firms has grown 
in many countries. This has partly emerged due to different incentive programs by the host 
countries to attract foreign direct investment (FDI).
1 From the point of view of the host country, the 
inward FDI may bring new technology and market access opportunities and thus strengthen the 
overall competitiveness in the economy. However, the growing importance of M&As has given rise 
to policy concerns due to the potential downside of foreign acquisition. It is frequently argued that 
foreign takeovers may have a detrimental effect on the targeted firms’ performance since foreign 
multinationals (MNEs) are less rooted in the local economy and have the possibilities of relocating 
production among their affiliates in different countries.  
 
In the light of the growing trends in international M&As, there are some important policy 
implications for governments worldwide to investigate the effects of foreign ownership on takeover 
targets performance. The objective of this paper is to study the effect of foreign acquisition on the 
target’s performance in the years following a takeover. I use recent unique detailed firm-level data 
for Sweden to investigate the role of foreign ownership for wages and productivity growth in 
targeted firms.  
 
Sweden is an interesting case to analyze in this context. Swedish authorities have implemented a 
number of political reforms to improve the business environment and, as a result, Sweden is one of 
the most internationally integrated and globalized economies in the world. However, it was not until 
1995 in connection with the Swedish membership of the European Union (EU), that there was a 
substantial increase in foreign ownership
2. Ever since then, Sweden has witnessed a rapid increase 
of inward FDI, mainly through mergers and acquisitions. Well-known former Swedish owned 
firms, such as Astra, Pharmacia, Volvo Car and Saab Automobile, changed ownerships in the 1990s 
and are nowadays foreign-owned. At the beginning of the 2000s, the employment share in foreign-
owned firms in manufacturing was among the highest in OECD.
3 
                                                 
1 Golub (2003). 
2 Malmberg and Sölvell (1998) stress that due to the Swedish membership of the EU, it has become more attractive to 
acquire Swedish firms. 
3 As compared to 21 other OECD countries in 2002, only Ireland, Luxembourg and Hungary had larger employment 
shares than Sweden in foreign- wned firms in manufacturing (Hansson et al. 2007).   2
The increase in foreign ownership has given rise to mixed feelings in the Swedish public debate, 
similar to other countries experiencing high growt h  o f  i n w a r d  F D I .  S o m e  f e a r  t h a t  f o r e i g n  
acquisitions will lead to job losses in acquired firms since foreign owners are less committed to the 
host economy. It is frequently argued that, owing to their possibilities of relocating production and 
employment among their affiliates in different countries, multinationals are more “footloose” than 
domestic firms (e.g., Bernard and Sjöholm, 2003) and hence more quickly respond to adverse 
shocks than domestic firms. However, foreign acquisitions can strengthen the competitiveness of 
the acquired firms if they transfer technology, knowledge and skills to the acquired firms and, 
hence, contribute to an improvement in the target’s performance, e.g. higher productivity and 
wages.   
 
From the theory on multinational enterprises (MNEs)
4, there are strong suggestions that 
multinationals are more productive than other firms and also might pay higher wages than the 
predominant wage level. The reason is that MNEs are supposed to possess firm-specific assets  
unique products and production processes or intangibles, such as trademarks or reputations for 
quality  that induce productivity and profitability gaps between MNEs and other firms. This idea 
builds upon the conjecture that doing business abroad entails higher costs and risks than operating 
on the domestic market; only the most productive and innovative firms will find it profitable to 
engage in foreign production.
5 In addition, due to the firm-specific assets, MNEs have an 
opportunity to pay non-competitive wages, i.e. in MNEs there exist some rents to be shared. The 
efficiency wage literature then offers some economic reasons why such a behavior could be 
profitable and increase productivity: (i) minimization of turnover costs
6 (ii) motivation on workers’ 
efforts, (iii) enhancement of workers’ loyalty, and (iv) selection of workers with high quality.
7 
 
By now there exists a large body of studies analyzing the relationship between foreign ownership 
and wages and productivity using panel data and the results are mixed. Conyon et al. (2002) 
examine wage and productivity effects of foreign acquisition using company-level panel data for 
                                                 
4 See the early contributions by e.g. Hymer (1960) and Dunning (1977). More recently, theories have been formalized 
and Markusen (2002) provides a thorough and synthesized survey of the modern models on MNEs. 
5 According to Dunning (1977), Markusen, (2002) and Helpman et al. (2004), only firms with a high productivity 
choose to serve a foreign market and among these only the most productive will choose to establish affiliates abroad. 
Helpman et al. (2004) also provide evidence that MNEs have significant productivity advantages relative to non-MNEs. 
6 It could be imagined that MNEs are particularly concerned about worker turnover when their firm-specific assets 
consist of proprietary technologies. Therefore, they may be willing to pay a wage premium to reduce the speed at which 
these technologies leak out to competitors as employees change jobs. 
7 Stiglitz (1987) surveys the theoretical literature on efficiency wages.   3
UK manufacturing for the period 1988-1994. They find that wages and productivity increase after a 
foreign takeover of a domestic firm, controlling for firm size and fixed-firm and industry-specific 
effects.  
 
Girma and Görg (2007) investigate the wage effect of foreign acquisitions using panel data of 
establishments in the UK food and electronics industries for the period 1981-1994. They apply 
difference-in-difference (DiD) propensity-score matching methods and find sizable, positive post-
acquisition wage effects on skilled and unskilled labor following acquisitions by US firms, but no 
such impact from acquisitions by EU firms. By using the same data and estimation methods, Girma 
& Görg (2006) find positive productivity effects in foreign-acquired establishments only in the 
electronic industries.  
 
Huttunen (2007) investigates the wage effect of foreign acquisitions using panel data on Finnish 
manufacturing establishments in the period 1988-2001, and her results indicate that foreign 
acquisitions have positive effects on wages. Martins (2004) and Heyman et al. (2007) are panel 
analyses of individual wages and both studies use DiD propensity-score matching methods. 
Heyman et al. (2007) find that the wage level is higher in firms targeted by foreigners than in non-
acquired firms in the entire Swedish private setor. However, the wage growth in acquired firms is 
lower than in firms that do not become foreign-owned. Moreover, Martins (2004) shows wage 
growth to be lower in firms acquired by foreigners. 
 
Bertrand and Zitouna (2005) and Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2004) analyze the productivity effect 
of foreign takeovers in the manufacturing sector in France and Finland, respectively. Both studies 
find that M&As significantly improve productivity in the targeted firms. Salis (2008), however, 
finds no effect on productivity as a result of foreign acquisition in Slovenian manufacturing firms. 
Modén (1998) and Karpaty (2007) use a sample of Swedish manufacturing firms to analyze the 
productivity effect in targeted firms. Modén (1998) finds mixed results while Karpaty (2007) finds 
a positive difference in productivity between acquired and non-acquired firms.  
 
I extend and improve upon these earlier papers in a number of ways. First, I focus on acquisition by 
foreign multinationals and use different econometric approaches to identify the causal effect of 
takeovers in post-acquisition periods. To this end, I first estimate a DiD regression model taking 
account of the potential endogeneity of the acquisition decision (for example due to “cherry 
picking”) by implementing an instrumental variable approach. As an alternative estimation strategy,   4
I use an extended version of the matched DiD method suggested by e.g. Blundell and Costas Dias 
(2000) by in the first step matching, on a yearly basis, the non-acquired and acquired firms with 
similar propensity score and in the next step estimate DiD on the matched sample
8 Second, using 
the detailed and unique data for Sweden I am not only able to distinguish the differences in wages 
and productivity between foreign MNEs and local firms, but also to separate domestically owned 
firms into MNEs and non-MNEs. This is crucial since theoretical heterogeneous firm models in 
international trade (e.g. Helpman, 2006) predict that the decisive difference should be between 
MNEs and non-MNEs, i.e. between foreign and domestic MNEs on the one hand, and non-MNEs 
on the other. I therefore analyze whether the impact of foreign acquisition on wages and 
productivity differs between takeovers of Swedish MNEs and non-MNEs. Third, I also allow the 
foreign acquisition effect to differ depending on whether the acquisition is horizontal (i.e within the 
same industry) or vertical. To my knowledge, this has not been investigated in earlier studies.  
 
To preview my results; I find, after controlling for possible endogeneity of the acquisition dummy 
and also controlling for a large number of firm specific characteristics, that foreign acquisition has 
no effect on overall, skilled or less-skilled wage growth in the post acquisition periods neither 
whether the acquisition is horizontal or vertical or whether the acquired firms were domestic MNEs 
or non-MNEs before the acquisition. However, I find positive productivity effect from vertical 
acquisition in targeted Swedish MNEs and non-MNEs, while I do not find evidence for an 
acquisition effect from horizontal takeovers. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the data and it shows some descriptive 
statistics on foreign-owned firms, Swedish MNEs and non-MNEs to see to what extent they differ. 
It also illustrates the increased importance of foreign ownership in Swedish manufacturing in the 
1990s. Section 3 outlines the analytical framework and the econometric specifications. Section 4 




                                                 
8 This methodology allows for different vectors of covariates xt in the matching and in DiD estimations.    5
2.   Data and description  
 
 
The dataset I employ in this study is from Statistics Sweden (SCB) and the Swedish Institute for 
Growth Policy Studies (ITPS). The dataset includes information from financial accounts of 
enterprises and register-based labor statistics for all manufacturing firms with 20 employees and 
more and for the period 1993 to 2002. For each firm, I have information on sales, labor 
productivity, capital-labor ratio, employment (skilled and less-skilled)
9 and various production 
inputs such as energy and intermediate costs. Moreover, I have information on firms’ ownership 
status (foreign or domestic) and whether a domestic firm is MNE or not. A foreign-owned firm is 
defined as a firm where foreign investors possess more than 50 percent of the voting rights and a 
Swedish MNE is a domestically owned firm that is part of an enterprise group with at least one 
affiliate and one employee abroad.
10,11 Using this information, I can separate the firms into foreign 
MNEs, domestic MNEs and domestic non-MNEs.
12 Moreover, by using the information on 
ownership status I can define foreign acquisition of a domestic MNE as a change in ownership 
indicator from a domestic MNE to foreign and foreign acquisition of a domestic non-MNE as a 
change in ownership indicator from a domestic non-MNE to foreign.
13 
 
The clear distinction into different ownership status before the foreign takeover is a distinct 
advantage of my data over the previous literature. This is an important dimension to the analysis 
since the acquisition effect on firm performance, i.e. on wages and productivity, may differ whether 
the target firms are multinational or not due to their ex-ante different characteristics as highlighted 
by, for example Helpman et al. (2004). Due to data limitation, not many studies that have 
investigated foreign acquisition have been able to take this into account.  
 
                                                 
9 Skilled labor is defined as employees with some post-secondary education. 
10 This is the definition used in the official statistics on international enterprises from the Swedish Institute for Growth 
Policy Studies (ITPS) and I can identify Swedish MNEs by linking data from ITPS to the microeconomic data from 
Statistics Sweden (SCB). 
11 My definition of Swedish MNEs differs from, for example, Heyman et al. (2007). In their study, Swedish MNEs are 
firms that report positive exports to other firms within the corporation. Such a measure is obviously deficient since 
firms might be MNEs even though they are not exporting to their affiliates abroad. 
12 1993 is the first year I can distinguish Swedish MNEs from non-MNEs and it explains why this analyze begins in 
1993. 
13 Firms that switch between domestic and foreign ownership more than once over the period are not included in the 
sample. Also, firms that disappear from the sample one year and reappear in later years are excluded.   6
Another issue that has not been investigated in the previous literature, mainly due to data 
availability, concerns the nature of the foreign acquisition and whether it is motivated by either 
horizontal (the acquired firms are within the same industry as the acquirer) or vertical motives. The 
effects of foreign acquisition on targets may be different depending on these two motives. If, for 
example, the aim of the horizontal acquisition is to eliminate competition and consolidate the 
industry, then it is likely that this may have a detrimental effect on the targeted firms’ performance 
following takeover. On the other hand, if the aim of the horizontal acquisition is to create new 
markets by using the already exiting facilities owned by other firm in the foreign markets, i.e., the 
acquirer indents to “grow by acquisition”, then the acquirer may transfer technology and knowledge 
in order to improve the quality in the acquisition target.  In this case, we would expect positive 
effect on the targets performance in the post-acquisition period. For the acquisition motivated by 
vertical motives, this is more likely to be the case since the motive of the acquisition is to acquire 
firms at different stages of the production process. It is then likely that the acquisition is done with a 
view to integrate the acquired firms into the multinational company structure which may lead to 
transfer of technology to improve or sustain quality.  
 
In separating the foreign direct investment into horizontal and vertical I use the Swedish data and 
check the industry classification for the acquired firm before and after acquisition. If the two digit 
industry code remains constant, I define the acquisition as horizontal and if it changed, I define the 
acquisition as vertical.  Using this definition I classify about 19 percent of all foreign acquisitions in 
my sample as vertical or non-horizontal.
14   
 
In the 1990s, many countries abolished or reduced their restrictions for foreigners to buy 
indigenous firms and as a result FDI increased substantially worldwide.
15  During this period, 
Sweden also introduced a considerable amount of liberalization reforms and as a result, the 
increase in foreign ownership seems to have been more pronounced in Sweden than in other 
OECD countries.
16 Table 1 shows how the numbers of firms and the employment shares have 
                                                 
14 This is not an ideal measure by any means.  In particular, it is likely that the vertical group includes both “true” 
vertical acquisitions of, say, supplier firms, but also conglomerate mergers where the target and acquirer are in 
unrelated industries.  Unfortunately, I do not have sufficient information to establish industry linkages.  Still, the 
measure allows me to compare horizontal and other types of acquisitions. 
15 Golub (2003). 
16 See Hansson et al. (2007). Other explanations put forward for the increased foreign ownership in Sweden in the 
1990s are that there were more invitations to acquire Swedish firms after the EU accession, Swedish firms were cheap 
to buy due to the devaluation at the beginning of the 1990s and the Swedish tax system has favored foreign ownership.   7
developed among foreign MNEs, Swedish MNEs, and Swedish non-MNEs over the period 1993-
2002. The employment share in foreign MNEs increased by almost 23 percent and their share of 
the firms increased by 6 percent. This trend seems to have evolved at the expense of Swedish 
MNEs since their employment share dropped by 19 percent and their share of firms has 
decreased by 5 percent. The employment and firm share for Swedish non-MNEs remained fairly 
constant over the period, however.  
 
Table 1 here 
 
During the 1990s, several large Swedish multinationals have become foreign-owned due to 
acquisitions by foreign MNEs, e.g. Pharmacia and Upjohn 1995, Saab Automobile and General 
Motors 1998, Astra and Zeneca 1999 and Ford and Volvo Car Corporation 1999. Table 2 reports, 
by year, the frequencies of foreign acquisitions in the manufacturing sector for firms with at least 20 
employees. The number of foreign acquisitions varies considerably between years, from 29 in 1998 
to 95 in 2001. In total, there are 464 foreign acquisitions and most of them, around 76 percent, 
consist of non-MNEs acquired by a foreign MNE. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Firms taken over by foreigners differ from non-target firms in many respects. Table 3 points out 
differences in characteristics and performance between acquired and non-acquired firms before and 
after acquisition for all manufacturing firms with 20 employees or more. In columns (i), which 
describe the situation one year before the acquisition ( 1   T ), we can see that Swedish firms taken 
over by foreigners are larger, have higher sales, are more productive, are skill-intensive and have 
higher wages than their non-acquired counterparts. Furthermore, acquired firms seem to have a 
higher capital-labor ratio one year before the acquisition as compared to non-acquired firms. These 
results provide us with some evidence of “cherry-picking”, i.e. that firms with good characteristics 
and performance are more likely to be targeted for acquisitions by foreigners.  From the other 
columns in Table 3 which depict the pattern at the time of acquisition ( 0  T ) and after acquisition 
( 0  T ), I infer that the differences between acquired and non-acquired firms appears to be 
persistent.  
 
Table 3 here   8
Differences in characteristics and performance between acquired and non-acquired firms in the 
years before acquisition could bias the estimates of the causal effect of foreign acquisition.  To 
overcome this problem, I use various methods: first, I estimate a regression model controlling for a 
large number of observable firm characteristics.  Second, I estimate a growth rate regression with 
the implementation of instrumental variable approach using the predicted probability of being 
acquired as an instrument (see McGuckin and Nguyen, 2001).  Third, as a robustness check, I use 
an extended version of the matched difference-in-difference (DiD) method suggested by e.g. 
Blundell and Costas Dias (2000).  
 
 
3.  The methodological framework 
 
 
To come to grips with the direction of causality between foreign acquisition and wages and total 
factor productivity (TFP)
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where  ln jT y   is growth in average wage (w) or TFP in firm j between time period  1  t  and  s t  ; 
 3,5 s . In some specifications, I divide average wage into skilled labor wage, (
s
jt w ), and less-
skilled labor wage (
u
jt w ). jt Acq  is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if firm j is foreign-
acquired at time t.  jt Firm   is a vector of growth rate of firm-specific characteristics, such as 
capital-labor ratio    ln / KL  , shares of medium-skilled    / MSL   and high-skilled labor 
 / HS L  , share of female workers    / Female L   and size    ln employment  .
18  jt Industry  is 
                                                 
17 TFP is calculated via the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) method. I have also used TFP that is calculated by means of a non-
parametric Divisia Törnqvist approach (see Karpaty, 2007) and value added per employee as different productivity 
measure. The results, not reported in this study but can be sent upon request, do not qualitatively change using different 
measure of productivity.  
18 Employees with some post-secondary education are defined as skilled labor. Most likely, such a division into skilled 
and less-skilled labor is more appropriate than the one which is often used, e.g. in Doms and Jensen (1998), i.e. the non-
production/production worker classification. In addition, I divide skilled labor into medium-skilled and high-skilled 
labor. Employees with a post-secondary education of three years or more are high-skilled labor and employees with a 
post-secondary education of less than three years are medium-skilled labor.   9
industry dummy variables
19,  t Year  is time dummies, and  jt   is an error term. The control groups in 
eq. (1) are firms that have not been acquired by foreign MNEs. 2   then capture the differences in 
wages and productivity between acquired and non-acquired firms. 
 
The acquisition dummy in equation (1) rests on the assumption that domestic firms taken over by 
foreign MNEs are randomly acquired. This assumption, as illustrated in Table 3, is a strong 
assumption. If foreign acquirers choose targets with a priori positive characteristics, a practice 
known as “cherry picking”, then the estimate of the casual effect of foreign acquisition will be 
biased. In order to control for the possible endogeneity of the acquisition dummy, I construct an 
instrumental variable as the probability of a firm being taken over by a foreign MNE.  This 
instrumental variable is constructed as the predicted value of the dependent variable from a probit 
regression for the probability of a foreign takeover, similar to McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) and 
Conyon et al. (2002). The set of instruments, and the probit regression results, are reported in the 
Appendix. 
 
As an alternative estimation strategy to control for the possible selection bias and to examine 
whether foreign-acquired firms enjoy a higher wage and productivity growth than non-acquired 
firms, I use a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) estimation technique on a selected sample that is 
generated using propensity score matching approach.
20  
 
The DiD estimator compares the difference in wages/productivity of the acquired (treated) firms A 
in the period before (t-1) and in the period after (t+s) acquisition with our control group of non-
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19 Industries are defined at the SNI92 3-digit level (99 industries). 
20 The method is frequently used in the evaluation literature on active labor market programs. Heckman et al. (1999) 
give a comprehensive overview of the labor economics literature. Becker and Ichino (2002) constitute a useful guide for 
handling matching with Stata. 
21 See Woolridge (2002).  10
where  1, jtt s y  is my outcome variable (wages or TFP) in period  1  t  to  s t  .  j Acq  is again a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 for acquired (treated) firms, A, and 0 otherwise for non-
acquired firms, C. It controls for constant differences in wages/productivity between target firms 
and firms in the control group before the acquisition. I define the dummy variable  s t After   as taking 
the value of 1 in post-acquisition years  s t   and 0 before acquisition  1  t . This dummy variable 
captures aggregate period effects that are common between the two groups A and C. Finally, the 
term  j ts Acq After   is an interaction term between  j Acq  and  s t After  . Its coefficient  3   represents 
the difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator of the effect of acquisition on the acquired (treated) 
firms A, i.e.  s t y   3  . An advantage of the DiD estimator is that it eliminates unobserved time-
invariant differences in wages/productivity between acquired and non-acquired firms. Table 4 
summarizes the interpretation of the coefficients in the regression in equation (2). 
 
Table 4 here 
 
 
The DiD is, however, not a valid estimator if the differences between acquired and non-acquired 
firms are very high in the years before the acquisition. To get a more accurate estimator, I use a 
sample where acquired firms (treated units) are matched together with similar firms that continue to 
be domestically owned (non-treated units). Here, the matched non-acquired firms approximate for 
the non-observed counterfactual event, i.e. what would on average have happened to the wages and 
productivity in acquired firms had they not been acquired by a foreign-owned firm. 
 
The matched sample is constructed as pairing, on a yearly basis, acquired with non-acquired firms 
with similar pre-acquisition characteristics X, e.g. skill intensity, age, size etc.
22 The method I adapt 
is a propensity score matching due to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). This technique has the 
advantage of summarizing all observables X into a single index variable. To implement a propensity 
score matching, I begin by estimating the probability (or propensity score) of being acquired by a 
foreign firm using the same probit model as in the instrumental variable approach. 
 
                                                 
22 This description of the essentials in matching techniques draws heavily on Bandick and Karpaty (2008).  11
Once the propensity scores are calculated, I can (by using the “calliper” matching method) select 
the nearest control firms in which the propensity score falls within a pre-specified radius as a match 
for an acquired firm.
23 Moreover, I check whether the balancing condition is verified, that is each 
independent variable does not differ significantly between acquired and non-acquired firms. 
 
Another condition that must be fulfilled in the matching procedure is the so-called common support 
condition. This criterion implies that at each point in time, a newly acquired firm is matched with 
non-acquired firms with propensity scores only slightly larger or smaller than the target firm.
24  
Furthermore, since my purpose is to study post-acquisition dynamics in wages and productivity, I 
only include firms that remain at least five years in the panel.
25    
 
Since the aim of the matching is to find a group of acquired and non-acquired firms with similar 
characteristics, I once more report, in Table A2, mean variable differences between the groups of 
firms that were successfully matched. Regarding to factor intensities and to firm size in terms of 
employment and sales, the matching procedure has been successful in reducing the difference 
between acquired and non-acquired firms. However, there are still significant differences in wages 
and total factor productivity. Hence, in the estimation of the DiD I control for a vector of firm 
characteristics to control for differences in observable attributes between firms. Moreover, to take 
the remaining differences into account I estimate equation (2) with a firm-fixed effect (FE) model. 
 
 
4. Empirical  results 
 
4.1  The result of the growth rate model 
 
The results based on the alternative way of generating the instrument for the acquisition 
dummies, jt Acq , in equation (1) are reported in Table 5, models (1) to (3). In all estimates, I control 
                                                 
23 The procedure I utilize to match treated (acquired) firms with control (non-acquired) firms is the PSMATCH2 routine 
in Stata version 9 described in Leuven and Sianesi (2003). In the analysis, the pre-specified radius is set to 0.01. 
24 Note that some acquired firms may be matched with more than one non-acquired firm, while acquired firms not 
matched with a non-acquired firm are excluded. 
25 Moreover, firms that switch back and forth between different ownership status and greenfield operations are 
excluded.  12
for changes in firm-specific characteristics similar to those included in equation (1).
26 To get a 
rough indicator of whether or not the assumption of exogeneity holds, I use a standard Hausman 
test. These tests, not reported in the table but available upon request, provide evidence that in all 
cases we can reject the assumption of exogeneity of the acquisition dummy.  
 
In the first estimation, the results of estimating equation (1) for the period  1  t  and  3 t   are 
reported. In the first three columns the dependent variable is growth in overall wage. In columns 
(iv) to (vi) the dependent variable is growth in skilled wage and in columns (vii) to (ix) the 
dependent variable is growth in less-skilled wage. Model (1) uses the instrument generated from the 
probit regression described in the Appendix, Table A1, column (i). The result indicates that three 
years after the acquisition, the wage growth, especially for skilled labor increased more in acquired 
firms than in non-acquired firms. On average, the growth in overall wage, column (i), is 0.8 percent 
higher in acquired firms after the takeover relative to non-acquired firms and the corresponding 
figure for skilled wage growth, column (iv), is 1.9 percent. However, for the less-skilled wage 
growth, column (vii), there seems to be no impact of foreign acquisitions three years after the 
acquisition.  
 
In models (2) and (3), the findings are based on alternative definitions of the instrumental variable. 
Model (2) uses the instrument generated in Table A1, column (ii), and the result for the overall, 
skilled and less-skilled wage growth are similar to those reported in model (1). In model (3), 
however, which uses the instrument generated in Table A1, column (iii), there seems to be no 
impact of foreign acquisitions on the wage growth. 
 
In the last three columns of Table 5 I report the result from estimating equation (1) having growth in 
TFP as dependent variable. The estimations in all three models are positive and highly significant 
which suggest that foreign acquisition have had a positive effect on total factor productivity in the 
years following acquisition. Depending on the alternative IV models, the difference in productivity 
growth between acquired and non-acquired firms is between 3 and 9 percent three years after the 
acquisition. 
 
                                                 
26 Note that, in order to get accurate standard errors for the estimators using generated IV I compute bootstrapped 
standard errors.   13
In the next estimation I examine the growth rate for the period  1  t  and  5 t  . From these 
estimations I infer that up to five year after the acquisition, acquired and non-acquired firms have 
had same development in overall, skilled and less-skilled wages. As to the result for the 
productivity growth, it seems that foreign acquisition has lead to increase the productivity by 
roughly 2 to 4 percent for the acquired firms five years after the acquisition.   
 
To allow for different impacts of foreign acquisitions on wages/productivity depending on whether 
a Swedish MNE or Swedish non-MNE is acquired, I add in equation (1) interaction variables, 
j SMNE Acq   and  j NonMNE Acq  . The first interaction variable captures the DiD between 
acquired Swedish MNEs and non-acquired firms while the second interaction variable captures the 
DiD between acquired non-MNEs and non-acquired firms. Also to allow the acquisition effect to 
differ for horizontal and vertical acquisition in equation (1), I add an interaction variable between a 
dummy for horizontal acquisitions and the foreign acquisition dummies and similar for vertical 
acquisitions. 
 
The results of estimating equation (1) with these modifications are reported in Table 5, estimation 
(3) and (4). Again the results are based on alternative IV models. I use similar probit models as in 
the basic model of equation (1) to generate the IV for the dummies vertical acquired Swedish 
MNEs, vertical acquired Swedish non-MNEs, horizontal acquired Swedish MNEs and horizontal 
acquired Swedish non-MNEs. Estimation (3) reports the result for the period  1  t  and  3 t   and 
estimation (4) reports the result for the period  1  t  and  5 t  . From these two estimations I find no 
impact from foreign acquisition on the wage growth neither in targeted Swedish MNEs or non-
MNEs and neither if the acquisition was motivated by vertical or horizontal motives. The results, 
however, indicate that both targeted Swedish MNEs and non-MNEs have better growth in TFP after 
vertical foreign acquisition only but no such impact from horizontal foreign acquisition. Based on 
the first IV model in column (x), a vertical foreign acquisition leads to an improvement in TFP 
growth by 3.5 percent for targeted Swedish MNEs after three years and 2.7 percent after five years. 
The corresponding figures for targeted Swedish non-MNEs are 3.1 percent after three years and 1.1 
percent after five years. 
 
Table 5 here 
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4.2  Difference-in-difference matching results 
 
For a further robustness check, I first implement a propensity score matching procedure to generate 
a sample of acquired and non-acquired firms which can serve as a valid counterfactual. I then 
estimate equation (2) on this matched sample, similar to Greenaway and Kneller (2007). Once again 
I extend the basic model of equation (2) to allow for different acquisition impact depending on the 
ownership statues of the takeover targets before the foreign acquisition and also depending on 
whether the acquisition was motivated by either vertical or horizontal motives. To do so, I replace 
the dummy variable  jt Acq  in equation (2) with four dummy variables, vertical acquired Swedish 
MNEs, vertical acquired Swedish non-MNEs, horizontal acquired Swedish MNEs and horizontal 
acquired Swedish non-MNEs. Moreover, to investigate the dynamic pattern of the post-acquisition 
wage and productivity effect, I replace the four interaction variables for the whole post-acquisition 
period with year-by-year interaction variables. Furthermore, since the matching procedure did not 
reduce all the differences between acquired and non-acquired (matched) firms, as shown in Table 
A2, I estimate the modified equation (2) with a firm-fixed effect model and control for a vector of 
firm characteristics such as capital-labor ratio, share of female workers, high-skill intensity and firm 
size. Table 6 reports the results.  
 
The matched sample in model (1) (column (i), (iv) (vii) and (ix)) is generated using the probit 
model described in the Appendix, Table A1, column (i) and the matched sample in model (2) and 
(3) are generated using the probit model in Table A1 column (ii) and (iii), respectively. The DiD 
estimators indicate that foreign acquisition have had, three and five years after acquisition, no 
effects on wages in acquired firms (Swedish MNEs and non-MNEs). The results appear to be robust 
depending on whether the foreign acquisition was motivated by vertical or horizontal motives.  
 
The results of the productivity effect in the post-acquisition years are reported in the three last 
columns of Table 6. The result indicates that vertical foreign acquisitions have had a positive effect 
on productivity growth in the years following takeovers. Three years after the acquisition the 
productivity in targeted Swedish MNEs and non-MNEs seems to have grown by almost 3 and 2 
percent more as compared to non-acquired firms. The productivity seems also to continue to grow 
five years after the acquisition. The difference in productivity growth between acquired and non-
acquired firms is between 1 and 2 percent five years after the acquisition. There is however no  15
significant impact on productivity from horizontal foreign acquisition, neither in targeted Swedish 
MNEs or in targeted Swedish non-MNEs. 
 
Table 8 here 
 
 
5.   Conclusions 
 
 
This paper has studied the effect of foreign acquisition on wages and productivity in the years 
following a takeover by using unique detailed firm-level data for the Swedish manufacturing during 
the 1990s. The distinct advantage of my data over the previous literature is that I can categorize all 
the domestic firms into being domestic multinationals with affiliates abroad or domestic non-
multinationals. This means that I can allow the acquisition effect to differ depending on whether the 
targeted firms were domestic multinationals or non-multinationals before the foreign takeover. This 
is an important dimension since the acquisition effect on firm performance may differ whether the 
target firms are multinational or not due to their ex-ante different characteristics as highlighted by, 
for example Helpman et al. (2004). Another distinct advantage of my data is that I can separate the 
foreign acquisition into being either horizontal or vertical acquisition. This means that I’m able to 
separate the effects of foreign acquisition on targets depending on these two motives.  
 
The results indicate that these two distinctions are indeed important. Foreign acquisitions seems to 
have no effects on wages neither in targeted Swedish MNEs or in Swedish non-MNEs and neither if 
the acquisition was motivated by vertical or horizontal motives. However, the results indicate that 
both targeted Swedish MNEs and non-MNEs have better growth in TFP after vertical foreign 
acquisition only but no such impact from horizontal foreign acquisition. 
 
Based on these findings, there are important implications of this study. Firstly, the result gives no 
support to the strong fears that foreign acquisitions may have a detrimental effect on the targeted 
firms’ performance. If anything, a foreign acquisition appears to have positive or neutral effects on 
wage and productivity growth. Secondly, it is important to consider heterogeneity in the acquisition 
impact, either by separating the different targets or by separating the acquisition motives, since not 
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 Table 1  Number of firms and employment shares in Swedish manufacturing,  
 1993-2002. 
 
    Foreign MNEs    Swedish MNEs    Non-MNEs 
Year  Firms  Employment  Firms  Employment    Firms  Employment 
   (Percent)   Percent    (Percent)    Percent    (Percent)   Percent 
1993 347 (13.1)  19.2  608 (22.9)  50.4  1699 (64.0)  30.4 
1994 374 (13.5)  19.9  622 (22.4)  52.3  1783 (64.2)  27.8 
1995 395 (13.4)  20.6  604 (20.4)  50.6  1955 (66.2)  28.8 
1996 443 (13.9)  24.0  556 (17.5)  46.7  2180 (68.6)  29.3 
1997 487 (14.8)  24.4  551 (16.8)  48.9  2247 (68.4)  26.7 
1998 513 (14.9)  25.8  556 (16.1)  46.4  2380 (69.0)  27.8 
1999 538 (15.8)  31.4  587 (17.3)  38.8  2273 (66.9)  29.8 
2000 578 (16.6)  35.3  605 (17.4)  35.7  2297 (66.0)  29.0 
2001 640 (18.2)  40.9  591 (16.8)  30.2  2278 (64.9)  28.9 




Table 2  Frequency of foreign acquisitions by year, 1993-2002. 
   1994   1995   1996   1997   1998   1999   2000   2001   2002  94-02 
Acquired  Swedish 2 8  53.2  9 8  18  7 6  13  113 
MNE  (5.0)  (22.9) (54.4) (26.5) (27.6) (40.0) (14.3)  (6.3)  (22.4) (24.4) 
Acquired  Swedish  38 27 37 25 21 27 42 89 45  351 
Non-MNE  (95.0) (77.1) (46.8) (73.5) (72.4) (60.0) (85.7) (93.7) (77.6) (75.6) 





Table 3  Differences in means between foreign-acquired firms and non-acquired firms in the 
period 1993-2002.  
  Acquired vs. non-acquired firms 
 Variable    1   T     0  T     1  T    2  T     3  T  
  Difference Difference Difference Difference Difference 
   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio) 
       
  Employment   277   286   323   329   333 
   (6.65)
***   (6.66)
***   (6.75)
***   (6.85)
***   (7.01)
*** 
   277   286   323   329   333 
  Sales   626   727   784   647   233 
   (7.12)
***   (6.78)
***   (6.09)
***   (5.01)
***   (2.28)
** 
       
  lnTFP   0.55    0.50   0.42   0.46   0.46 
   (10.02)
***   (9.72)
***   (8.43)
***   (9.15)
***   (8.73)
*** 
         
  Capital-labor  ratio    150   138   146   164    165 
   (2.41)
***   (2.46)
***   (2.48)
***   (2.49)
***   (2.46)
*** 
       
  Skill  intensity   5.4   5.5   5.4   5.0   5.1 
   (5.13)
***   (5.60)
***   (5.73)
***   (5.23)
***   (5.26)
*** 
       
  Average  wage   26   26   27   25   23 
   (7.48)
***   (7.45)
***   (8.95)
***   (7.94)
***   (6.93)
*** 
       
 Wages:  skilled   71   68    64   61   55 
   (9.72)
***   (9.51)
***   (9.52)
***   (9.01)
***   (7.48)
*** 
       
Wages:  less-skilled    19   19   19   18    17 
   (7.10)
***   (7.06)
***   (7.78)
***   (7.46)
***   (6.41)
*** 
       
  Observations       
 Acquired  firms   192   192   192   192   192 
  Non-acquired  firms    3,659   3,659   3,659   3,659    3,659 
Notes: Sales is in million SEK. Wages and capital-labor ratios are in thousand SEK. Skill intensity and share of 




Table 4  Difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator. 
 Before 
acquisition 
 After  acquisition    Difference   
Acquired firms    1 0     
0123       23     
Non-acquired firms    0      02       2   
Difference between acquired 
and non-acquired firms  
  1     13       3    21
Table 5  Post-acquisition effect on wages and productivity, instrumental variable approach.  
 Average  waget+3 Average skilled wage t+3  Average less-skilled wage t+3 TFP t+3 
  Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) 
Estimation (1)  (i) (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)  (vii) (viii) (ix)  (x)  (xi)  (xii) 









              
Observation 13,470  13,470 13,470 13,470 13,470 13,470 13,470 13,470 13,470 13,470 13,470 13,470 
              
Estimation (2)  Average waget+5  Average skilled wage t+5 Average less-skilled wage t+5 TFP t+5
Foreign acquisition  0.002   0.002  -0.002  0.005  0.007  -0.003   0.001  0.002  -0.005  0.045   0.022   0.039  




              
Observation 8,207  8,207 8,207 8,207 8,207 8,207 8,207 8,207 8,207 8,207 8,207 8,207 
              
Estimation (3) Average waget+3 Average skilled wage t+3  Average less-skilled wage t+3 TFP t+3 
Vertical acquired  0.002   0.002  0.002  0.014   0.012   0.009  0.002   0.002   0.002   0.035   0.040   0.023  









              
Vertical acquired  0.002   0.002  0.001 0.006   0.004   0.001  0.001   0.001   0.002   0.031   0.036   0.019  
Swedish non-MNE  (1.66)




              
Horizontal acquired  0.001   -0.001  0.001  0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001  -0.001   0.001   0.010   0.009   0.006  
Swedish MNE  (0.85)  (0.28) (1.27) (0.04) (1.43) (0.06) (1.10) (0.17) (1.55) (1.57) (1.30) (1.41) 
              
Horizontal acquired  0.001   0.001  0.001  0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001   0.014   0.019   0.011  
Swedish non-MNE  (2.15)
**  (2.19)
** (0.38) (0.31) (0.01) (0.13) (2.23)
** (1.71)
* (0.13) (1.28) (1.37) (1.04) 
              
      
Estimation (4)  Average waget+5 Average skilled wage t+5  Average less-skilled wage t+5 TFP t+5 
Vertical acquired  -0.001   -0.001  0.001  -0.004   -0.004   -0.004   -0.001   -0.002   0.002   0.027   0.010   0.018  




              
Vertical acquired  -0.001   -0.001  -0.003  -0.006   -0.003   -0.008   -0.001   -0.001   -0.001   0.011   0.012   0.010  




              
Horizontal acquired  -0.001   -0.001  -0.001  0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001   0.009  0.007   0.003  
Swedish MNE  (0.09)  (0.47) (1.28) (0.63) (2.31)
** (0.12) (0.76) (0.05) (1.20) (1.23) (1.03) (0.80) 
              
Horizontal acquired  0.002   0.001  0.001  0.001   0.002   0.001   0.002   0.001   0.001   0.008   0.007   0.006  
Swedish non-MNE  (2.12)
**  (2.08)
** (1.35) (0.29) (1.44) (0.01) (1.97)
** (2.08)
** (1.21) (1.19) (0.94) (1.09) 
Notes: Standard errors within the parentheses are bootstrapped. ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Estimations in Model 1 
use an instrument generated from the probit regression reported in Table A1, column (i).  The estimation in Model 2 uses an instrument generated from column (ii) in 
Table A1; estimations in Model 3 use an instrument from column (iii) in Table A1. In all the estimates, I control for changes in firm-specific factors similar to these 
included in Table 4. The Hausman tests, not reported but available upon request, reject the assumption of exogeneity of the acquisition dummy.  22
Table 6  Effects of foreign acquisition on post-acquisition average wage and TFP. DID on matched sample with firm fixed effect. 
 Average  wage Average skilled wage   Average less-skilled wage TFP  
  Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)  (vii) (viii) (ix)  (x)  (xi)  (xii) 



























              



























              



























              




























              
























              
























              
























              
























              
Firm controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
              
2 R  within  0.700 0.719 0.735 0.215 0.185 0.259 0.673 0.685 0.712 0.049 0.034 0.039 
2 R  between  0.287 0.379 0.414 0.022 0.066 0.049 0.291 0.332 0.374 0.031 0.198 0.004 
2 R  overall  0.405 0.468 0.484 0.081 0.116 0.129 0.412 0.444 0.467 0.031 0.091 0.002 
Observations  4,823 4,823 4,823 4,823 4,823 4,823 4,823 4,823 4,823 4,823 4,823 4,823 
Notes: As firm controls I use capital-labor ratio, share of female workers, high-skill intensity and firm size. Square brackets [ ] give White’s heteroskedasticity-
consistent t statistics. The matched sample in Model (1) is generated using the probit model in Table A1, column (i). The matched sample in Model (2) and Model (3) 





The probit model 
 
The instrumental variable is constructed as the predicted value of the dependent variable from a 
probit regression for the probability of foreign takeover, similar to McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) 
and Conyon et al. (2002). The probit model is 
 
   1 1, , jtj t i t p Acq F X D D    (A.1) 
where X is a vector of firm characteristics in t-1.  i D  and  t D  control for fixed industry and time 
effects. The vector of firm characteristics in equation (A.1), in the first instance, includes labor 
productivity in firm j, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is a Swedish MNE or not, 
current employment size (relative to the industry mean), skill intensity, firm age, age-squared and a 
measure of foreign presence in the industry. The latter measure captures potential spillover effects 
in an industry.   
 
The results of estimating equation (A.1) are reported in Table A1. I find that skill-intensive and high 
productivity firms are more likely to be acquired by foreign firms. Moreover, firms in industries 
with a large foreign presence are more often taken over. Finally, it appears that younger firms (non-
linear relationship), relatively large firms, and Swedish MNE firms have higher probabilities of 
being targeted by foreign firms.  
 
I also estimated alternative specifications of equation (A.1), including additional variables in the 
probit estimation, to check whether my results depend on the process by which the instrument was 
generated.  These results are reported in columns (ii) and (iii) of Table A1. The estimations of 
equation (1) in Table 5 and equation (2) in Table 6 are robust to this change in the instrument 




Table A1   The probit model – probability of foreign acquistion 
 Variables  (i)  (ii)  (iii) 
      
Labor productivity  0.125  0.022  0.083 
 (2.75)
*** (0.47)  (1.81)
* 
      
Swedish MNE  0.116  0.055  0.040 
 (2.37)
** (1.11)  (0.78) 
      
Relative employment  0.005  -0.002  -0.001 
 (2.33)
** (0.65)  (0.45) 
      





      





      
(Age)





      





      
Capital  intensity   0.087  
   (6.17)
***  
      
Sales     0.028 
     (6.74)
*** 
      
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R
2 0.037  0.046  0.050 
LR chi2  139.58  177.57  181.22 
Observations 23,931 23,931 23,931 
Notes: The dependent variable  1 jt Acq   if a domestically owned firm in year  1  t  becomes foreign-owned in year t. 
z-statistics are within parentheses. The explanatory variables are, with the exception of age, age
2 and relative 
employment, firm-specific characteristics in year  1  t . Relative employment is firm employment relative to mean firm 
employment at the industry level. Labor productivity is value added per employee and skill intensity is the share of 
employees with post-secondary education at the firm level. The share of foreign employment at the industry level 
(SNI92 2-digit level) is a proxy of foreign presence in the industry.  25
Table A2  Differences in means between foreign-acquired firms and non-acquired firms in the 
period 1993-2002. Matched sample. 
  Acquired vs. non-acquired firms 
 Variable    1   T     0  T     1  T    2  T     3  T  
  Difference Difference Difference Difference Difference 
   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio) 
       
  Employment   99   88   126    139    156 
   (0.98)   (0.84)   (1.04)    (1.15)   (1.32) 
       
  Sales   380   424   462   280    -166 
   (1.46)   (1.39)   (1.29)   (0.92)   (0.73) 
       
 lnTFP    0.27  0.19    0.11    0.14   0.18 
   (4.73)
*** (3.59)
***   (2.03)
**   (2.65)
**   (3.10)
*** 
       
  Capital-labor  ratio    -21    75    81   113   109 
   (0.09)    (1.15)
.   (1.13)    (1.86)
*   (1.69)
* 
       
 Skill  intensity   1.9   2.0   1.7   1.2   1.4 
   (1.56)    (1.69)
*   (1.43)   (1.06)   (1.22) 
       
  Average  wage    19   19   21   16   13 
   (7.37)
***   (5.82)
***   (7.60)
***   (5.20)
***   (3.29)
*** 
       
  Wages:  skilled   39   35   34   28   19 
   (6.76)
***   (6.26)
***   (6.09)
***   (4.65)
***   (2.13)
** 
       
Wages:  less-skilled    15   16   18   14    10 
   (6.24)
***   (5.03)
***   (7.64)
***   (4.82)
***   (3.23)
*** 
       
  Observations       
 Acquired  firms   181   181   181   181   181 
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